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Transaction cost determinants of credit governance structures of commercial banks in 
Tanzania 
 






This paper explores transaction cost determinants of credit governance structures (CGS) of 
commercial banks in Tanzania. Descriptive statistics, linear regression model, binary and 
multinomial logistic regression models were employed for analysis. Findings revealed four 
modes of credit governance structures that are used by commercial banks to penetrate rural based 
credit market without fear of high transaction costs. These modes of CGSs might be used to 
absorb transaction costs in different magnitudes, allow commercial banks credit operations scale 
up to rural areas and maximize profitability. The most important TC determinants include high 
illiteracy rate (lack of entrepreneurial and financial management skills), poor infrastructures, 
unclear political will and commitment towards rural development, culture barrier (poor tradition 
and customs) and lack of national identification system. It was also revealed that, under 
commercial banks credit operations in Tanzania, credit contract monitoring and enforcement 
transaction costs were the highest categories of TCs, which is contrary to what suggested by 
previous authors. 
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1.0 Background information 
Transaction cost is an important determinant of choice of the best credit governance structure of 
commercial banks in Tanzania. In a market where transaction cost is too high, there may not be 
transaction at all.  Such behavior is portrayed by commercial banks in Tanzania where most 
provide credit services to urban based customers and have ignored rural based customers. 
According to Finscope survey (2013), only 6.8% of Tanzanians who live in rural areas have 
access to financial services from banking sector. Information gap between commercial banks and 
rural based borrowers was a major setback on commercial banks behavior of dealing directly 
with individual borrowers, resulting in high transaction costs. High transaction costs influenced 
commercial banks decision not to provide credit services at all to rural based borrowers, in turn 
negatively affects both commercial banks and rural based population,FSDT (2013). Since 
liberalization of banking industry of Tanzania in 1991, commercial banks mostly preferred to 
directly deal with customers as far as credit provision services is concerned, this tendency 
resulted in limited credit supply from commercial banks to most part of the country, especially 
rural areas due to inability to manage associated credit transaction costs as reported in AgFiMS 
(2011). Major challenges in rural finance in Tanzania relate to information gaps which fall into 
three categories: (i) Knowledge of rural demand and market segmentation by financial 
institutions; (ii) Financial illiteracy of rural borrowers; (iii) Commercial banks knowledge of best 
channels/methods for penetration to rural based market at low transaction costs (TCs), FSDT 
(2013).  
 
Information is a key input that goes into the credit decision of commercial banks. One of the 
challenges for commercial banks is to acquire information about the credit risk of the borrower, 
as borrowers have more information than the lender about the projects (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Transaction cost economic theory argues that banks are not interested in offering credit to 
MSMEs, farmers and poor households because information asymmetries resulting to high 
screening costs, credit contracts negotiation costs, monitoring, and enforcement costs. 
 
Under asymmetric information conditions commercial banks are uncertain about the future 
behavior of the borrower in terms of repayments. High transaction costs problems are more 
likely to occur when commercial banks deal with MSMEs, farmers and poor households 
especially in developing countries rural areas due to higher opacity (Berger et al.2001; Beck et 
al.2004; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008; Cole 2004). By opaqueness means, it is difficult to 
ascertain if borrowers have the capacity to pay (have viable project) and/or willingness to pay 
(due to moral hazard) (Beck, 2010). Information asymmetry between borrowers and the 
commercial banks is reflected in inability of the majority of rural based borrowers to provide up 
to date reliable financial information and realistic business plans, which increases credit 
transaction costs. Consequently limits the ability of banks to assess the credit-worthiness of the 
individual borrowers. And therefore commercial banks believed to be better-off with some few 
known credit worth urban based customers, Kessy and Temu (2010). 
 
The argument of information asymmetry is supported by Olomi (2009) and Kibassa (2012) who 
emphasized that poorly compiled records and financial accounts coupled with inability of rural 
based borrowers to properly express their knowledge about business opportunities aggregates the 
lack of adequate information by commercial banks, thus increases credit transactions costs, 
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especially when dealing with rural based borrowers in Tanzania.  Satta (2003; 2006) amplify this 
argument by pointing out lack of adequate and reliable collateral, lack of appropriate instrument 
to manage risk, not being familiar with complicated information about rural based borrowers and 
perceived risks make Commercial banks in Tanzania become unwilling to provide the much-
needed finance particularly to rural based borrowers. 
 
Therefore Commercial banks opt not to provide credits at all or to ration and tighten 
requirements in order to protect themselves from likely opportunistic behavior of borrowers. 
With an appropriate choice of a credit governance structure (CGS) as determined by transaction 
costs, commercial banks will be able to penetrate the rural based market, small and emerging 
commercial banks will enter into credit supply business. Hence increases competition, credit 
accessibility and in turn lower borrowing interest rates, (Mkenda and campenhout, 2011), 
Unfortunately the environment for commercial bank’s credit operation is not conducive due to 
inadequate infrastructure/facilities for smooth banking operations, difficulties in 
identification/accessibility of information for potential customers/borrowers and nature of 
customers (who wants many but small sized credits/loans. Bureaucratic procedures and 
reditapism by village and district councils, lack of collateral or collateral of low market values. 
These are some of the barriers that make banking operations in URT to be very costly and 
inefficient, especially for small private commercial banks, BOT (2011). 
 
The liberalization of banking industry in 1991 aimed at allowing many private commercial banks 
to enter the industry thus increases competition in provision of banking services, i.e credit 
service, increases accessibility of banking services by many, lowering banks credit interest rates 
and ultimately eliminating monopoly of three banks CRDB and NBC and NMB within the 
industry. Thus improves the industry efficiency. Currently still the environment is not conducive 
to allow efficient operations for most private commercial banks to provide credit services 
especially in rural areas due to above problems that lead to high transaction costs as suggested in 
Tanzania banking sector performance report of 2010, BOT (2010). Few large commercial banks 
that were previously supported by GOT, i,e CRDB,NBC, NMB were able to absorb high 
transaction costs of providing credits in most part of the country, even in rural areas and yet 
attain super profits at expense of the borrowers. Since they shift such high costs as an interest 
element to borrowers. These few big banks to some extent are monopoly in nature when it comes 
to provision of credit facility in URT.  Hence the environment for credit provision and 
governance structure/channels for credit supply need to be properly assessed, analyzed and 
designed Ernst&Young (2013). This will allow many commercial banks to provide credits in 
both rural and urban markets, increases competition, lowering transaction costs and borrowing 
interest. Ultimately minimizes transaction costs of offering credits by commercial banks in 
Tanzania and maximizes profitability. 
 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Despite their ability to incur high transaction costs, only a few commercial banks in Tanzania 
enjoy high profit levels at the expense of borrowers by shifting the burden of high transaction 
costs to borrowing interest rates. Such banks could be considered efficient in some ways in terms 
of observed non transaction cost attributes like volumes of credits given out, profitability, and 
repayments. Williamson (2000, 2001) suggested that when the cost of carrying out a transaction 
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is too high, there won’t be transaction at all hence where the banks are not operating they are by 
implication, considered inefficient in transaction cost terms. Coarse (1984, 1992) argued that, 
firms with ability to absorb high transaction costs, enjoy high profit volumes. In Tanzania few 
big commercial banks have to some extent, monopolized the market for credit supply due to their 
ability to absorb transaction costs. 
 
Recent studies in Tanzania on efficiency of commercial banks focused on conventional 
approaches of measuring efficiency and performance through analyzing banks profitability, 
repayment rates, accessibility to services, geographical coverage, transformational(operational) 
costs, interest rates, number of borrowers, productivity and portfolio quality, (Wangwe, 2004; 
Aikaeli, 2008; Ernst &Y oung, 2010; Serengeti, 2012).  
 
This study focused on transaction cost as determinants of CGSs of commercial banks in 
Tanzania for credit operations scale-up purpose. Other scholars have done researches on 
application of transaction costs on Credit Governance structures (CGS). Their focus was mainly 
on demand for credits and not supply side. (Ngaruko, 2008) focused on how economic reforms 
of Tanzania influenced diversity characteristics of farmers, their farm investment and ultimately 
their demand on agro-credits. He made his analysis through application of transaction costs 
theory. (Mkenda and campenhout, 2011) conducted a research on estimation of transaction costs 
in Tanzania supply chain. They focused their analysis on commodity exchange of agricultural 
products.  
 
The current study focus on how transactions cost determine the best CGS of commercial banks 
in Tanzania. It recognizes the need to assess structures that govern credit supply by commercial 
banks. Thus to identify and advice on the most suitable CGS given transaction costs. Since the 
amount of transaction costs incurred by banks in supplying credits influences choice of a CGS. 
With cost efficient CGS, small commercial banks will enter into credit supply business. Hence 
increases competition, credit accessibility and in turn lower borrowing interest rates.    
 
1.2 Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of this paper are three fold: 
(a) To describe commercial banks credit governance structures (CGSs) and transaction 
costs categories in credit administration.   
(b) To identify significant transaction costs determinants associated with CGSs of 
commercial banks to current and potential customers 
(c) To analyze effects of transaction costs on choice of CGS by commercial banks  
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 The economics of organization: Transaction costs approach 
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as 
the basic unit of analysis and holds that understanding of transaction costs economizing is central 
to the study of organization. Application of this approach require that, transactions be 
dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described. Economizing is 
accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structure in a discriminating way. The 
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approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries, as between firms and 
markets, and to the organizational of internal transactions, Williamson, (1981). 
 
Williamson (2000), pointed out that, the proposition that the firm is a production function to 
which a profit maximization objective has been assigned has been less illuminating for 
organization theory purposes than for economics. Even within economics, however, there is a 
growing realization that, the neo-classical theory of the firm is self-limiting. A variety of 
economic approaches to the study of organization have recently been proposed in which the 
importance of internal organizations is acknowledged. The one described here emphasizes on 
transaction costs and efforts to economize there on. Economic approaches to the study of 
organizations, transaction costs analysis included, generally focus on efficiency. To be sure not 
every interesting organizational issue can be usefully addressed, except perhaps in a minor way, 
in efficiency terms. A surprisingly large number can, however, especially if transaction costs 
aspect are emphasized. This is accomplished by making the transaction rather than the 
commodities the basic unit of analysis and by assessing governance structures of which firms 
and markets are the leading alternatives in terms of their capacity to economize on of transaction 
costs, Williamson (2010). 
 
Efficient Boundaries decided what transactions are to be included in the organization and 
effectively defines the organizational boundary. If assets are nonspecific, markets enjoy 
advantages in both production cost and governance cost respects; static scale economies can be 
more fully exhausted by buying instead of making; markets can also aggregate uncorrelated 
demands, thereby realizing risk-pooling benefits; and external procurement avoids many of the 
hazards to which internal procurement is subject. .Some advantages of firms over markets 
include internal organizations are able to invoke fiat to resolve differences and better access to 
information. Incentive to shift transactions inside the firm increases with uncertainty. 
 
Williamson argues in The Mechanisms of Governance (1996) that Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) differs from neoclassical microeconomics in the following aspects: Behavioral 
assumptions, whereas neoclassical theory assumes rationality and ignores most of the hazards 
related to opportunism, TCE assumes bounded rationality. Unit of analysis, whereas neoclassical 
theory is concerned with composite goods and services, TCE analyzes the transaction itself. 
Governance structure, whereas neoclassical theory describes the firm as a production function (a 
technological construction), TCE describes it as a governance structure (an organizational 
construction). Problematic property rights and contracts, whereas neoclassical theory often 
assumes that property rights are clearly defined and the cost of enforcing those rights by the 
mean of courts is negligible, TCE treats property rights and contracts as problematic. Discrete 
structural analysis, whereas neoclassical theory uses continuous marginal modes of analysis in 
order to achieve second-order economizing (adjusting margins), TCE analyzes the basic 
structures of the firm and its governance in order to achieve first-order economizing (improving 
the basic governance structure).Remediable, whereas neoclassical theory recognizes profit 
maximization or cost minimization as criteria of efficiency, TCE insists that there is no optimal 
solution and that all alternatives are flawed, thus bounding "optimal" efficiency to the solution 
with no superior alternative and whose implementation produces net gains. 
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2.2 Review of Empirical literature 
Banks contribute to economic growth through their financial intermediation role. Banking sector 
in Tanzania has experienced fundamental changes over the last decade following banks and other 
financial institutions reforms starting from the early 1990s. However, what is still concealed is 
the extent to which banks are efficient in Tanzania. Banking industry in Tanzania is open to 
entry and therefore it is highly contestable. Commercial banks in the country can be subdivided 
into three major categories: large domestic banks; subsidiaries of the major international banks; 
and small banks. About 50 percent of the total banks’ assets are held in the large domestic banks 
while subsidiaries of the major international banks account for 40 percent and the small banks 
hold the remaining 10 percent, BOT (2010). 
 
High transaction costs in provision of credit services to majority of Tanzanians (peasant farmers, 
small business owners, etc.) has been a major reason for dominance of few big banks in the 
market, and non-competitiveness nature of credit supply markets. Williamson (2000, 2001) 
suggested that when the cost of carrying out a transaction is too high, there won’t be a 
transaction at all. This has been the case for most commercial banks that operate in Tanzania. 
The infrastructures and information available to facilitate provision of credit services are 
inadequate and not conducive. As a result, commercial banks have to incur so much cost to 
search information of potential borrowers, to negotiate borrowing contracts and to enforce them 
in case of default, Olomi (2009). Only few big commercial banks can afford to absorb such costs 
and still maximize profit. Most banks exit the market or just concentrate in urban areas with 
some few credit worth customers, FSDT (2013). 
 
Risk vulnerability of the Tanzanian banks which was examined through stress test found that 
banks were generally resilient to shocks (IMF-World Bank, 2003). This IMF-World Bank study 
also singles out the high degree of liquidity as one of the outstanding features of banks in 
Tanzania. Efficiency in banking has been defined and studied in different dimensions including: 
(i) scale efficiency, which refers to relationship between the level of output and the average cost; 
(ii) Scope efficiency, which refers to relationship between average cost and production of 
diversified output varieties; and (iii) Operational efficiency, a wide concept sometimes referred 
to as x-efficiency, which measures deviation from the cost efficient frontier that represents the 
maximum attainable output for the given level of inputs. With reference to various definitions, 
inefficiency is therefore a multifaceted concept with several meanings depending on the 
perspective in which it is used (Leibenstein, 1966). Scale and scope economies for example, are 
achieved from the firms’ output expansion resulting in an increase in the industry’s output. And 
that reduces costs of production thus leading to the strong technological external economy. 
Hirshleifer and Glazer (1993) argue that scope economies occur where it is cheaper to produce 
varieties in a plant than in separate plants, and this is the concept from which banking 
consolidation stems. The central objective of this study is to assesstransaction cost determinants 
of credit governance structures of commercial banks in Tanzania. 
 
The positive underlying principle that derives efficiency analysis in economics stems from the 
urge to create and enhance tangible value. While the normative raison d'etre for efficiency 
analysis is founded on the challenge to obtain useful policy information. (Debreu, 1959; Varian, 
1992; Schenk, 2004), argue that if there is a change which makes at least one individual better 
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off without making any one else worse off, that change is efficient. The relationship between 
cost function and production function, which underlines efficiency assessment, was first 
established by Shephard (1953, 1970) with assumption of theoretically known efficiency. 
Quantitative methods for measuring total economic efficiency (with assumption of unknown 
theoretical efficiency) were pioneered by Farrell (1957). In economic theory there are algebraic 
and geometric characterizations of production plans that can unambiguously be regarded as non-
wasteful (efficient). According to Mas-Colell et al. (1995), a production vector y Є Y is efficient 
if there is no y' Є Y such that y' ≥ y and y' ≠ y. This concept means a production vector y is 
efficient if there is no other feasible production vector y' that generates as much output as y using 
no additional inputs. This philosophy is the basis of the illustrative Production Possibility 
Frontier (PPF). 
 
Looking specifically at banks in the face of financial liberalization in transition economies, the 
sector experiences an unprecedented consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Maggi and 
Rossie (2003) suggest that the only way to lower costs in the banking industry is to improve x-
efficiency instead of paying close attention to cross border mergers and acquisitions. According 
to Jemrić and VujČić (2002), there are questions which continue to dominate financial sector 
discussions in developing countries, if small banks will manage to exist in the era of 
globalization and banking market consolidation and the relevance of allowing new banks. A big 
number of U.S. empirical studies of banks efficiency have used panel data analysis. These 
studies overall (Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Mitchell and Onvural , 1996) 
conclude that the U.S. banks average cost curve is relatively flat when compared to European 
banks. Most of empirical work on European banks however, has focused on cost functions using 
data from single bank or country. They find a U-shaped average cost curve, and to some extent, 
scope economies exist (Parisio, 1992; Berger et al., 1993; Drake and Simper, 2002). It is 
noticeable from these results that the choice of specific approach to efficiency study as well as 
the definitions of inputs and outputs in multi-product financial firms model, will most likely 
affect the estimates. 
 
A case study of commercial banks efficiency in Namibia by Ikhide (2000) used operating ratios 
and parametric approach to measure efficiency for the 1993–1998 period. Ikhide found 
substantial existence of economies of scale in Namibian banks but they were not operating at the 
minimum point of average cost curve. Some other studies of banks efficiency have included 
measures of non-performing loans in the cost or production function. Berger and De Young 
(1997), studied problem loans and cost efficiency in U.S. commercial banks and found that low 
cost efficiency occurred before soaring non-performing loans. In the literature there is an 
evidence of relationship between a sound intermediation process and efficiency in the banking 
system as suggested by (Horward and Haynes, 2001; Vittas, 1991; Kenny and Moss, 1998). 
Lindley et al. (2000), explain the circumstance of low banks’ capacity in the context of huge 
deposits inflow (excess liquidity) that overwhelms the ability of banks to produce income-
earning assets. Under certain conditions as explains Baltensperger (1972), reserves adjustment is 
closely related with the optimal bank production position (efficiency). With reference to scale 
efficiency, and the presumption of negligible low reserve adjustment cost, he argues that a large 
bank will be more often profitable to adjust its reserves towards the optimal level, and it will, on 
average, stay relatively closer to its optimal position than a small bank. 




This research to a large extent adopts quantitative paradigm. A paradigm is understood as a way 
of looking at the social reality or the world that is composed of certain philosophical assumptions 
that guide and direct thinking and actions (Mertens 1998 in Milliken, 2001). According to 
Johnston (2014) the approach chosen for a research project is influenced by ontological and 
epistemological assumptions or stances of the researcher. Morgan and Sklar (2012) cite that, 
ontology refers to what is reality while epistemology is concerned with how reality can be 
known. Within social sciences there has been a long standing debate about the most appropriate 
philosophical positions between positivism and phenomenology from which research methods 
should be derived, Milliken (2001). Positivists who advocate for natural science, reject 
subjectivity in research by assuming that an objective world exists independently of the 
researcher and that one can uncover universal laws of human nature and social reality, Patton and 
Appelbaum (2003). On the other hand, a phenomenologist’s researcher believes that the world 
and reality are not objective and exterior but that they are socially constructed and given 
meaning by social actors, Milliken (2001). Current study advocates positivism ideology. The 
approach adopted in this study (positivism) aims at utilizing hypotheses to test existing theories 
for generalization purpose in different settings. 
 
3.1 Research Design 
Current study used quantitative descriptive design. The study utilized quantitative and statistical 
aspect of data presentation and analysis through figures, numbers and tables. A survey strategy 
was opted for the above design.  The study was carried out in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. A 
sample of 204 credit officers from all commercial banks that provide credit services to micro, 
small and medium enterprises and farmers with headquarters in Dar es salaam,were involved in 
the study and one commercial bank (people’s bank of Zanzibar) with headquarters in Zanzibar 
was also included in the study. Current study was not extended to other regions since the amount 
and quality of data captured in Dar es salaam and Zanzibar was satisfactory. 
 
3.2 Sampling design 
The targeted population was from all commercial banks with headquarters in Dar es salaam and 
Zanzibar where the targeted sampling unit was commercial bank’s credit officers.  Due to 
inability to determine sampling frame for this sample population, a non- probabilistic sampling 
method was followed; a purposive sampling technique was used. Only respondents with credit 
administration knowledge and working under credit /loan department of commercial banks were 
included in the sample of 204 respondents. G power software was used in calculating the sample 
size since the population was not known with reliability. Input parameter in G power were, α err 
prob= 0.05, power (1-β err prob) = 0.8, odd ratio = 0.6, two tail test, normal distribution and the 
output result for the sample size is 204.  
 
3.3 Data Collection Methods 
The study employed different methods of data collection, whereby both primary and secondary 
data were collected. Structured questionnaires for survey were administered to commercial banks 
credit officers to collect primary data. A questionnaire is a set of systematically structured 
questions used by a researcher to get needed information from respondents. Questionnaires have 
been termed differently, including surveys, schedules, indexes/indicators, profiles, studies, 
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opinionnaires, checklists, scales, inventories, forms, inter alia. They areany written instruments 
that present respondents with a series of questions or statements to which they are to react either 
by writing out their answers or selecting from among existing answers,Brown (2001). The 
questionnaire may be self-administered, posted or presented in an interview format. A 
questionnaire may include check lists, attitude scales, projective techniques, rating scales and a 
variety of other research methods. As an important research instrument and a tool for data 
collection, a questionnaire has its main function as measurement, Oppenheim (1992). It is the 
main data collection method in surveys and yield to quantitative data. Also, due to provision for 
open ended, the instrument may be used to generate qualitative and exploratory data, Dornyei 
(2007). The study also used secondary data. The main sources were documentary review of 
various official documents and reports (i,e, BOT reports) relevant to the research problem from  
commercial banks and different libraries. 
 
 
3.4 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
The relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables is represented by the 
expression in equation (1): 
ipipiii XXXY   ...22110 ……………………………………………………… (1) 
 
Predication equation is therefore expressed as in equation (2); 
pipiii XXXY   ...22110 …………………………………………………………… (2) 
 
Where 0i , β0 is the constant term and β1 to βp are the coefficients relating the p explanatory 
variables of interest. Multiple linear regression analysis was used to identify the relationship 
between dependent variable (total transaction costs) and a combination of independent variables 
(costs elements for each transaction costs category). The following general equation of multiple 
linear regressions was utilized for this study; 
 
iiii TECTNCTSCTTC   3210 ……………………………………………………(3) 
 
Where εi usually equated to zero and hence predication equation was; 
iii TECTNCTSCTTC 3210   …………………………………………………………(4) 
 
Where: 
TTC= Total Transaction costs 
TSC=Information search costs 
TNC=Credit contracts negotiation costs 
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Logistic Regression Analysis 
In the case of logistic regression, the X’s can be numerical or categorical, but Y’s are generally 
coded as 0 (for those who do not have the event) or 1 (for those who have the event). According 
to Bryman and Cramer (1990), the logistic model is based on a linear relationship between the 
natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of an event and a numerical independent variable. The form of 















Where Y is binary and represent the event of interest (response), coded as 0/1 for failure/success, 
 P is the proportion of successes, 
 L is the ln (odds of event), 
 X is the independent variable, 
 B0 and B1 are the Y-intercept and the slope, respectively 
 εi is the random error. 
 
Computations of the estimates of 𝛽0𝑎𝑛𝑑𝛽1 in logistic regression are far more complicated, P is 










We defined L = ln(odds of event Y), sometimes called the “log odds” or logit of Y. We can write 















The logistic regression model may be written in terms of P, the risk of event Y, assuming that L 























Current study used logistic regression method for analysis of third specific objective and testing 
of third hypothesis. Where transaction costs were predictors while CGSs were dependent 
variables (dichotomous). This tool assessed the likelihood of commercial banks choosing a 
particular CGS and not others given Transaction Costs. Every CGS (1-4) were equated as a 
function of transaction costs. This means each TC category was tested against each CGS to 
determine the likelihood of choosing or not a particular CGS. Thus for each TC tested across 
four CGS (CGS1-4), the most cost efficient governance structure was  revealed and 
recommended for scaling up. Variables of transaction costs determinants that were used in this 
study includes but not limited to borrowers distance, expected borrowing frequency(loyalty), 
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customer reputation, loan amount, trust, collateral market value. The mathematical representation 
of the above: 
 
)(TCDfTC  …………………………………….…………………………………………….(9) 
 
Whereby; )( TECTNCTSCTC  ……………………..……………………………………(10)  
 
),,()41( TECTNCTSCfCGS  …………………………..………………………………….(11) 
 
TSC includes but not limited to transport, meetings, village authority fee, reputation, personal 
relationship, time spent in searching and screening borrower. TNC includes but not limited to 
cost of lawyers, allowances for meetings, paperwork, personal relationships, transport costs, 
levies, opportunity cost of time spent in negotiation, reputation and TEC cost includes but not 
limited to penalties, enforcement campaigns, police and court case costs, time for making follow 
ups, cost of lawyers, reputation. Binomial logistic regression gave binary outcome. For example 
1 meaning success and 0 failures when predicting whether a CGS has been chosen or not based 
on TSC, TNC, and TEC.  The logistic regression model gives the likelihood that, given CGS’s 
TSC, TNC, TEC, that they are chosen (in this example, the higher the probability, the greater the 
chance for the CGS to be chosen). Again, a number of coefficients were obtained, but this time 
was used to calculate a LOGIT. As a general formula logit is given in equation 12 as; 
 
εcTECbTNCαTSCIntercept4)CGS(1 ofLogit  ……………………………….(12) 
 
Usually,  is equated to 0 since focus is on TSC (search costs), TNC (negotiation costs) and TEC 






















Equation 12 was fitted and got values for a, b, c and the intercept; logit value was calculated 
from given data. Thus the probability P was calculated and established chances (likelihood) of 
choosing a particular CGS. 
 
Multinomial logistic regression was also used to predict choice of an efficient CGS. Where the 
dependent variable has four different options (CGS1-CGS4) matched against categories of 
transaction costs, at each time, one option of dependent variable was set as a reference category. 
Agresti (1990) explainedthat multinomial Logistic Regression is the linear regression analysis 
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conducted when the dependent variable is nominal with more than two levels.  Thus it is an 
extension of logistic regression, which analyzes dichotomous (binary) dependents.  Multinomial 
logistic regression analysis assumed that, all four credit governance structures (CGS1-CGS4) 
existed, but at each time analysis was made, one CGS was used as a reference category and 
determined the CGS more likely to be selected given transaction costs. 
 
 
4.0 Main Findings 
4.1 Alternative modes of governance structure for CB credit supply 
Current study revealed four different categories ofCredit governance structure CGS1 to CGS4; 
these may be used by commercial banks to mitigate TCs and distribute credits in the URT. Each 
CGS has its own associated level of TC, depending on the choice of a CGS for credit distribution 
to borrowers. The level of TCinfluence the choice ofCGS for credit supply by commercial bank 
under different circumstances. Therefore TSC, TNC and TEC, were independent input variables 
that affects choice of CGS. Commercial banks in Tanzania offer MSMEs credits, personal 
loans/credits, corporate credits to companies and agriculture credits. Any credit transaction 
carried out under each credit governance structure involves transaction costs that if over looked 
may result to high costs, inefficiency in operations of commercial banks and hence no 
transaction at all.  
 
Figure 1: Flow of Credit from Commercial Banks to Borrowers through Different Channels 
 
DR in Figure 1 is Direct Cchannel, CB   stands for commercial bank, BR   is ultimate borrower 
(user of credits) ,TC is transaction costs, PIB is profit- Intermediary bank; i.e. Community 
development banks, PIM is profit Intermediary microfinance Institution i.e. SACCOS, NPI is 
non-profit intermediary i.e. government institutions that guarantee credits from CB to employees, 
CGS   stands for credit governance structure. 
 
4.2 Preference of CGSs by commercial banks in Tanzania 
Table 1shows how 204 respondents from 34 commercial banks in Tanzania prefer distributing 
credits, using various credit governance structures (CGSs). 66.2% of all respondents from 
commercial banks in Tanzania prefer distributing credits directly to individuals rather than using 
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intermediaries. Only 5.9% preferred using profit making intermediary banks, i.e community 
development banks as channel of distributing credits to borrowers. 16.7% of respondents from 
commercial banks in the country prefer issuing credits to borrowers through profit making 
microfinance institutions like SACCOS. The remaining 11.2% mostly prefer servicing credits 
through non-profit making intermediaries. As findings above shows, only 33.8% of all 
respondents from commercial banks in the country can service credits through intermediaries. 
The rest of commercial bank’s respondents believe it’s costly and inefficient for them to use 
intermediaries in supplying credits. 
 
Table 1: Preference of CGSs by respondents from commercial banks in Tanzania 
CGSs Frequency Percentage (%) 
CGS1 135 66.2 
CGS2 12 5.9 
CGS3 34 16.7 
CGS4 23 11.2 
Total 204 100.0 
 
As reported from BOT report of 2014, about 50% of commercial banks profits depend on credit 
business operation. From study findings, current credit business operating environment force 
most commercial banks to prefer credit governance structure one (CGS1). Preference of CGS1 
supports servicing of credits to urban based customers and not rural based customers. Majority of 
those in need of credit services are located in rural and not urban areas in Tanzania. Given 
current credit business operating environment, usage of CGS1 to supply credits to rural based 
customers, results to high transaction costs that most commercial banks cannot afford to absorb, 
thus renders them inefficient in terms of transaction costs. For the purpose of credit business 
scale up, efficiency and profit maximization given the current non conducive credit business 
operating environment, commercial banks should prefer more indirect channels for credit supply 
(CGS2-4), rather than CGS1. 
 
Findings from this study, showed that 97.6% of respondents from all commercial banks in 
Tanzania prefer dealing with urban based customers as far as credit business is concerned. 
Arguments behind their decision is inaccessibility of rural areas due to poor infrastructure and 
other supportive facilities, difficulties in identifying, locating and accessing information of rural 
based customers and therefore resulted to further difficulties in monitoring and enforcing credit 
contracts with most rural based customers. Above reasons, highly contributed to massive rise of 
credit transaction costs that most commercial banks cannot afford to absorb when using CGS1. 
Since they prefer dealing directly with borrowers, most opted not to provide credit services at all 
to rural based customers to avoid high transaction costs and thus dealt more with urban based 
customer. High preference of urban based customers, supported commercial banks preference of 
CGS1.  Usage of CGS1 by commercial banks on urban based customers assisted them to attain 
optimality but not efficiency since they minimize transaction costs but failed to scale up their 
credit operations to rural part of the country where majority of those in serious need of credits 
live. 
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Table 2: Total transaction costs for CGS1-4 (Tshs)  
N TC for CGS Minimum Maximum Mean 
204 Total costs for CGS1             1590000 16100000 2392600 
204 Total costs for CGS2 1640000 16000000 2662500 
204 Total costs for CGS3 1230000 7110000 4436400 
204 Total costs for CGS4 1650000 20100000 11313000 
 
CGSs were descriptively compared, as seen in table 2 CGS1 carries lowest levels of transaction 
costs than other CGSs. Thus commercial banks preferred it more than others. In the table below 
respondents preferences were matched against total transaction costs and the findings 
complement those appeared in the table above, CGS1 carries lowest transaction costs than other 
governance structures. Current study findings also revealed that, 97.6% of respondents preferred 
urban based customers. Therefore, commercial banks incurred minimum transaction costs that 
they can afford to absorb as long as they deal with urban based customers. According to BOT 
(2004) reports, more than 50% of commercial banks profits depend on credit operations, also 
70.4% of all Tanzanians live in rural areas. Thus for profit maximization purposes, commercial 
banks needs to penetrate rural based credits markets and CGS1 is not ideal for that purpose. 
Commercial banks must use CGSs with intermediaries to allow shifting of risks and costs to 
intermediaries. 
 
Table 3. CGSs and Transaction costs (Tshs) 
 CGS1 CGS2 CGS3 CGS4 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Total transaction costs 15,561,442.77 31,160,506.00 31,043,669.15 31,040,781.87 
 
4.3 Categories of total transaction costs 
From transaction cost theory, especially the one stipulated by Williamson (2010) in new 
institutional economics, transaction costs has been divided into three categories (i) Information 
search costs (ii) Contract negotiation costs (ii) Contract monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Findings from current study similarly evidenced the same transaction costs categories, but these 
costs differ from one another depending on influence of individual transaction costs determinants 
within each costs category. Some determinants were dominant than others, like cost of time and 
transport cost in the current study. 
 
Table 4: Transaction costs categories (Tshs) 
N  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
204 Total search costs 663000 6880000 3535300 2001980 
204 Total negotiation costs 852000 4030000 2894300 931803 
204 Total enforcement costs 3320000 45500000 14375000 7931510 
      
From table 4, credit contracts monitoring and enforcement costs was very high, more than twice 
combination of both costs of searching borrowers information and credit contracts negotiation 
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costs, while TNC was the lowest. This is a clear indication of poor borrowing and repayment 
behavior of borrowers in Tanzania. Most borrowers do not have tangible reason for borrowing, 
thus instead of using the money to facilitate growth of income generating activities, the money is 
being diverted to other uses which resulted to failure of making repayments. Commercial banks 
are very sensitive to risks of losses, especially those originated from credit business operations 
since it’s one of the major income generating activities of banks in Tanzania. With that in mind, 
commercial banks invest heavily in debt collection so as to minimize or completely avoid losses 
from non-repayments of credits by defaulters. Commercial banks in Tanzania invest more in 
provision of credit facility to few customers in urban areas, that they consider credit worth, in 
turn considerable number of such customers became defaulters. Due to that fact, commercial 
banks spent so much costs to monitor and enforce credit contracts, to make sure non repayment 
is reduced if possible avoided. These findings are contrary to what suggested by Ngaruko (2008), 
Williamson (2010), Mkenda and Campnhaut (2011), that information search costs was the 
highest transaction costs category than other categories. This implies, huge investment is made 
on searching transacting partners, while current study revealed, under commercial banks credit 
operations, banks invest more in monitoring and enforcement of credit contracts rather than 
investing in searching new transacting partners (borrowers). 
 
4.4 Predictors of total transaction costs 
In Table 5, variables used as determinants for total transaction costs in the current study were 
matched to test their relationship strength. Only those with weak relation were taken for further 
analysis, the rest were ignored to avoid jeopardize credibility and reliability of results. From the 
table 5, there is a strong positive relationship between time variable of transaction cost and the 
rest of variables, such as transport costs, local authority fees, food and refreshment costs, costs 
for measuring borrower’s business viability, costs for breaching credit contracts, case filing 
costs, third party costsas well as tips and other charges. Therefore, since they are strongly related 
and share similar magnitude, only one variable is taken to represent other variables, and for this 
case, time variable. Therefore, time variable and other variables that,it has weaker relationship 
with,meeting facilitation costs, and lawyer fees in credit negotiation, were used in regression 
analysis below. The relationship between time cost and lawyer fees in contract negotiation is 
positive but weak at r= 0.249. When time variable increases, lawyer fees will also increase at a 
very low rate. There is also a positive relationship but weak at r= 0.491 between time variable 
and meeting facilitation costs, therefore lawyer fees and meeting facilitation costs variables do 
not have high influence on time costs variable. And the relationship between meeting facilitation 
costs and lawyer fees during credit negotiation is very weak but positive at r= 0.149. The 
following are worth noting from table 5. ** implies that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed), whereas *implies Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). PC stands for 
Pearson Correlation.  
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Table 5: Correlations of Determinants of Total Transaction Cost 
  
Transport 
costs Cost of time 
Local 


















Transport costs  PC 1 .898** .961** .352** .494** .739** .883** .879** .856** .406** .792** 
Sig.   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Cost of time PC .898** 1 .799** .249** .575** .771** .779** .771** .782** .491** .656** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Local authority fees PC .961** .799** 1 .337** .467** .603** .894** .882** .872** .259** .795** 
Sig.  .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Lawyer fees  PC .352** .249** .337** 1 .282** .278** .419** .394** .404** .149* .314** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .034 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Food& refreshment costs  PC .494** .575** .467** .282** 1 .446** .511** .438** .517** .219** .151* 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .031 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
business viability  PC .739** .771** .603** .278** .446** 1 .584** .601** .585** .439** .486** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Contracts breaching cost PC .883** .779** .894** .419** .511** .584** 1 .886** .879** .292** .766** 
Sig .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Case filing costs  PC .879** .771** .882** .394** .438** .601** .886** 1 .979** .248** .764** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
 N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Third party costs  PC .856** .782** .872** .404** .517** .585** .879** .979** 1 .208** .693** 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .003 .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Meeting facilitation costs PC .406** .491** .259** .149* .219** .439** .292** .248** .208** 1 .330** 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .034 .002 .000 .000 .000 .003  .000 
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
Tips&other charges PC .792** .656** .795** .314** .151* .486** .766** .764** .693** .330** 1 
 Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .031 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 
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Further findings shows transport costs and cost of time variables have strong positive correlation 
at r=0.898, these variables highly influence each other. Only cost of time was included for 
further analysis. Cost of time and local authority fees shares a strong positive correlation at 
r=0.799, thus local authority fees was not included in the next stage of analysis. Lawyer fees 
variable and cost of time variable have positive but weak relationship at r=0.249, they both 
qualify for further analysis. Several other variables, include food and refreshment variable, 
business viability, contracts breaching costs, case filing costs, third party costs, tips and other 
charges have strong positive correlation with cost of time variable at r=0.575, r=0.771, r=0.779, 
r=0.771 r=0.782, r=0.656 respectively. Since they were highly influencing each other and share 
similar magnitude, only time cost variable was taken to represent other variables and avoid 
possibilities of jeopardizing the results. Meetings facilitation costs and cost of time have positive 
but weak relationship at r=0.491 and were both included in the next stage analysis. Three 
variables (time, meeting facilitation costs, and lawyer fees in credit negotiation) with weak 
correlation were taken for further analysis to determine their causality effect on total transaction 
costs 
 
Table 6: Actual Predictors of Total Transaction Costs 
  TTC Cost of time Lawyer fees  Meetings costs 
PC TTC 1.000 .859 .413 .318 
Cost of time .859 1.000 .249 .491 
Lawyer fees  .413 .249 1.000 .149 
Meeting costs .318 .491 .149 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) TTC . .000 .000 .000 
Cost of time .000 . .000 .000 
Lawyer fees  .000 .000 . .017 
Meetings costs .000 .000 .017 . 
 
From table 6, correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test). The findings showed 
strong positive correlation between time variable and total transaction costs (dependent variable) 
at r= 0.859. Several variables were left out from this analysis due to the fact that, they had strong 
correlation with time cost variable and thus using them all togather  could have reduced 
credibility of results. Time costs variable was used, but if any among those variables was used, 
could have yield almost similar results as time costs variable. While the two other explanatory 
variables, lawyer fees and meetings facilitation costs portrayed weaker but positive relationship 
with the total transaction costs at r=.0.413 and r=0.318.  
 
4.5 Transaction Costs and Choice of credit governance structures (CGSs) 
Each model of CGS used similar predictors (TSC, TNC and TEC) in determining the likelihood 
of whether selected or not, while assuming other CGSs were not existing. Each credit 
governance structure matched against total transaction costs (total information search costs, total 
credit contracts negotiation costs and total credit contracts monitoring and enforcement costs), to 
determine the likelihood of such particular CGS to be selected given transaction costs. Binomial 
logistic regression analysis was opted. The likelihood test that uses significance levels of 
predictors, odd ratios, Wald and magnitude of coefficients, can be well done through variables in 
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the equation tables. The table used in the current study has combined coefficient tables of all four 
CGSs as appeared below. 
 
Table 7:Predictor’s coefficients for CGS1-CGS4 
CGS1 
B S.E. Wald Df Sig.  
TSC 1809400 .000 14.092 1 .000  
TNC -2228200 .000 7.950 1 .005  
TEC 21225000 .000 9.261 1 .002  
Constant -2.903 .943 9.475 1 .002  
 CGS2 B S.E. Wald Df Sig.  
 TSC -13474000 .000 .465 1 .495  
TNC 57080000 .000 3.382 1 .066  
TEC -5679000000 .000 .018 1 .894  
Constant -.854 .535 2.546 1 .111  
CGS3 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. 
TSC -181150 .001 28950 1 .986 
TNC -225130 .002 10742 1 .992 
TEC -1841500 .000 24478 1 .988 
Constant 202.027 12150 27655 1 .987 
CGS4 
B S.E. Wald df  Sig. 
TSC -30662000 .000 1.069 1  .301 
TNC -21724000 .000 .398 1  .528 
TEC -18273000 .000 5.800 1  .016 
Constant 3.235 .668 23.431 1  .000 
 
Results from the predictors coefficient table 7, clearly indicate the likelihood of an individual 
variable to influence selection of a credit governance structure. Starting with CGS1, all three 
predictors(TSC, TNC, and TEC) have significant influence, TSC and TEC are more significantly 
likely to positively influence selection of CGS1. TNC is negatively likely influencing CGS1. 
Increase in TSC and TEC increases the likelihood of commercial banks selecting CGS1 since it 
does not involve transaction costs multiplier effect of using intermediaries. In comparison with 
CGS2, only TNC is significant and it’s very likely to positively influence selection of CGS2. 
Increase in total negotiation costs also increases likelihood of commercial banks to supply credits 
through profit making intermediary banks (CGS2). Since they are formal financial institutions 
and reputable, TNC can be easily mitigated. TSC and TEC likelihood to influence CGS2 is 
negative, but not significant. The likelihood of TSC, TNC and TEC to influence selection of 
CGS3 is not significant. Despite the fact all variables are negatively related to selection of CGS3, 
the likelihood that when they decrease, CGS3 preference could be higher by commercial banks is 
minimal and not significant. In comparison to CGS4, all predictors negatively relate to selection 
of CGS4 as it was to variables under CGS3. The main difference is, the likelihood of TEC to 
significantly influence selection of CGS4 when TEC decreases, is very high, while TSC and 
TNC have no significant contribution. When cross reference was made between four CGSs from 
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the results above, variables (predictors) contribution was more significant and highly influence 
selection of CGS1. The likelihood of commercial banks selecting CGS1 was highly predicted 
than other CGSs that uses intermediaries (CGS2, CGS3 and CGS4). 
 
4.6 Multiple credit governance structures (CGSs) with reference category 
Binary Logistic regression model was applied to prediction selection of a particular credit 
governance structure while assuming the remaining three CGSs were not existing. Thus the 
choice was dichotomous. Multinomial logistic regression, used all four CGSs to gather, during 
the analysis, one governance structure at each time was used as a reference category. The best 
CGS was determined at each particular time as one credit governance structure kept as a 
reference category.When CGS1 was selected as a reference category, TSC increased only by 
4.7% of the total value decrease of summation of both TNC and TEC, when choice of CGS2 was 
made. TSC increased only by 5.6% of the value decrease of combination of both TNC and TEC, 
if choice of CGS3 was made.  While TSC increased by 78.1% of the value decrease of 
summation of both TNC and TEC if choice of CGS4 was made. Therefore, this analysis entails 
CGS2 to be the best for credit supply by commercial banks in the country since the percentage of 
TCs increased was minimal compared to CGS3 and CGS4, when CGS1 is a reference 
category.When CGS2 was used as a reference category, TSC decreased by 4.7% of the value 
increase of combination ofboth TNC and TEC, if the choice made was CGS1. Given choice of 
CGS3, TSC decreased only by 1.2% of the total increase of the value of combination of both 
TNC and TEC. Furthermore TSC decreased by 9.2% of increase in summation value of both 
TNC and TEC, if choice of CGS4 was made. Given the analysis made, when CGS2 is a 
reference category, CGS4 was the best for credit supply by commercial banks since its ability to 
absorb transaction costs was higher compared to remaining credit governance structures. 
 
When CGS3 was selected as a reference category, decrease in TSC was 5.6% of the summation 
value increase of both TNC and TEC if choice of CGS1 was made. If CGS2 was selected, TSC 
expected to increase by 1.2% only of the value decreased of summation of both TNC and TEC. 
If choice of CGS4 was made, TSC would have increased by 90.3% of the total value decrease of 
summation of both TNC and TEC. Given transaction costs and the analysis made, when CGS3 
used as a reference category, CGS2 was the best CGS for commercial banks credit supply due to 
its ability to absorb high transaction costs compared to CGS1 and CGS4. When CGS4 was a 
reference category and choice of CGS1 was made, the influencing factor, TSC decreased by 
78.2% of the value increased by summation of both TNC and TEC, thus 21.8% of transaction 
costs value remained unabsorbed. When CGS2 was selected, TSC increased by 9.3% of the total 
value decrease of summation of TNC and TEC. And when the choice made for CGS3, the 
influencing factors, TSC decreased by 90% of the increased value of summation of both TNC 
and TEC. Given transaction costs and the analysis made, CGS2 is the best for credit supply since 
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Table 8: Multinomial regression results for choice of CGSs  
a) CGS1 reference category 
  






















TSC 1373600 .000 1 .026 1.000 
TNC -1001500 .000 1 .191 1.000 
TEC -28226000 .000 1 .016 1.000 
TSC 17663000 .000 1 .539 1.000 
TNC -28755000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TEC -288830000 .000 1 .638 1.000 
TSC 69673000 .000 1 .261 1.000 
TNC -68023000 .000 1 .269 1.000 
TEC -21231000 .000 1 .122 1.000 












TSC -1373600 .000 1 .026 1.000 
TNC 1001500 .000 1 .191 1.000 
TEC 28226000 .000 1 .016 1.000 
TSC -1196900 .000 1 .056 1.000 
TNC 71391000 .000 1 .360 1.000 
TEC  25338000 .000 1 .036 1.000 
TSC -67684000 .000 1 .298 1.000 
TNC 32123000 .000 1 .705 1.000 
TEC 699480000 .000 1 .628 1.000 
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c) CGS3 Reference Category 
 
 




It has been evidenced from the study findings that, it is not satisfactory to simply consider a 
commercial bank as efficient in terms of credit transaction costs when using a mode of credit 
governance structure that is economizes transaction costs. The selected mode of credit 
governance structure not only has to economize transaction costs but also has to grant an 
opportunity for commercial banks to scale up their credit operations to both rural and urban 
areas. According to transaction cost economics theory, a CGS is considered efficient as long as it 
economize transaction costs, with an assumption that, where there is transaction costs 
economization, there is also massive flow of transactions. Above facts do not apply to 
commercial banks credit operations in Tanzania because flow of credit transactions from 
commercial banks is limited especially in rural areas despite usage of CGS1. Thus commercial 
banks should use multiple CGSs (especially CGS2 and CGS3) with intermediaries to be able to 
mitigate high transaction costs and scale up to rural areas for efficiency and profitability 
purposes and CGS1 for urban based credit customers. Conclusively findings suggest that, 
commercial banks should engage alternative modes of CGSs at different circumstances. Under 
binomial logistic analysis, CGS1 likelihood to be selected was highest than other CGSs, but 
usage of CGS1 to rural based borrowers, tend to multiply transaction costs to the extent that 
commercial banks fail to absorb, while under multinomial logistic analysis, which is superior to 








TSC -17663000 .000 1 .539 1.000 
TNC 28755000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TEC 288830000 .000 1 .638 1.000 
TSC 1196900 .000 1 .056 1.000 
TNC -71391000 .000 1 .360 1.000 
TEC -25338000 .000 1 .036 1.000 
TSC 52010000 .000 1 .411 1.000 
TNC -39268000 .000 1 .538 1.000 
TEC 
-18343000 .000 1 .191 1.000 











TSC -70004000 .000 1 .258 1.000 
TNC 68298000 .000 1 .267 1.000 
TEC 21187000 .000 1 .123 1.000 
TSC 67711000 .000 1 .298 1.000 
TNC -32162000 .000 1 .705 1.000 
TEC -699710000 .000 1 .628 1.000 
TSC -51541000 .000 1 .415 1.000 
TNC 38860000 .000 1 .542 1.000 
TEC 18464000 .000 1 .188 1.000 
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binary analysis, CGS1,CGS2 and CGS3 were all recommended as highly likely to be used by 
commercial banks for credit distribution and thus assist to mitigate transaction costs as well as 
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